This paper presents interactive geometrical depictions of the Shapley value, nucleolus, and per-capita nucleolus surplus-sharing rules for cooperative games with three players. The program graphically demonstrates how the simplexes corresponding to a host of characteristic functions are "shrunk" to their corresponding cores, calculates allocations using the Shapley Value, nucleolus, and per-capita nucleolus surplus-sharing rules, and graphically depicts the locations of these allocations in the corresponding cores.
Introduction
The need to understand surplus-and cost-sharing rules in cooperative game theory is prevalent at both the undergraduate and graduate levels (Moulin, 1988 and 2004) .
However, the rules are generally depicted as raw mathematical problems that entail the calculation of a vector of allocations. This paper presents interactive geometrical depictions of the rules for games with small numbers of players (the executable program in win32 platform is available at http://cc.usu.edu/~slk1r/teaching/tugames/tugame.htm).
The program (i) demonstrates how the simplexes associated with a host of characteristic functions are "shrunk" to their corresponding cores, (ii) calculates the corresponding allocations using the Shapley Value, nucleolus, and per-capita nucleolus surplus-sharing rules, and (iii) graphically depicts the locations of these allocations in the corresponding cores. It is therefore a supplementary tool that can be used to enhance the instruction of surplus-sharing rules in either undergraduate-or graduate-level cooperative game theory courses.
The next section discusses the relevant preliminaries of cooperative game theory, focusing on derivations of the Shapley Value and nucleolus surplus-sharing algorithms.
Section 3 discusses the interactive geometry for these rules. Section 4 concludes.
Preliminaries of Cooperative Games
Let N be a set of n players with 2 N denoting the corresponding power set of N (i.e., the set of all possible coalitions based on N, including the empty and grand coalitions) and
denoting a characteristic function that allocates some outcome (e.g., coalitional cost or surplus) among each element of 2 N . An allocation in the grand coalition of the n players is represented by
. The core of the game (N, v) is the set of all allocations that induces each of the n players to rationally join in the formation of the grand coalition, i.e., i i N' core ( , ) : ( ) for all coalitions 2
Provided that v generates solely positive values (i.e., surplus as opposed to cost), three common types of games are typically considered:
The core for games of type (i) is a singleton, i.e., }) ({i v x i = for each player i, corresponding to the Shapley value. Games of type (iii) guarantee a non-empty core that includes the Shapley value. Games of type (ii) are a parent class of types (i) and (iii), but unlike types (i) and (ii) the existence of the Shapley value in the core is not ensured. 1
We can represent the marginal contribution of agent i to coalition N' as
We have as many as 
is known as the Shapley value (SV) of game (N, v).
Calculation of the SV is straight-forward, particularly for games with small numbers of players. For example, in the three-player game with coalitional surpluses depicted in Table 1 ,
Similar calculations for players 2 and 3 yield allocations x 2 = 3 and x 3 = 4, respectively.
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]
The nucleolus provides an alternative method of obtaining an allocation x. Begin by noting that the net benefit, or "excess" for the members of coalition N' that results from 1 See Moulin (1988) for further details on the relationships between additivity, superadditivity, convexity, the core, and the Shapley value. Examples of each of these outcomes for game types (i) -(iii) can be shown using the interactive geometry presented in Section 3.
joining the grand coalition is given by
. Also note that there are 2 n values of such coalition-wise net benefits associated with forming the grand coalition (including the empty and grand coalitions). The basic concept of the nucleolus is to choose an allocation x in such a way that the best leximin ordering of these values is obtained. 2 Here, a leximin ordering
In other words, w is leximin preferred to u if the smallest element of w is greater than the smallest element of u, or they are equal but the second smallest element in w is greater than the second smallest element in u, and so on (Maniquet, 2002) .
vector accounting for each element (i.e., coalition N' ) in 2 N , then the nucleolus, *
x , is such that ( *) e x is leximin preferred to ( ) e x for any x. To see how the nucleolus is determined, consider the threeplayer game with coalitional surpluses depicted in Table 2 (Serrano, 1999) .
[ INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] Following Serrano (1999) , begin by considering the "equal-split" vector of surpluses x = (14,14,14) , where the individual surpluses sum to v(N) = 42. Thus, e(x) = (-12,-2,8,14,14,14) , where the worst-treated coalition is {2,3} with an excess of -12. From an egalitarian perspective, it therefore seems to make sense to transfer some of player 1's surplus to players 2 or 3. Let the transfer occur from player 1 to player 3, resulting in the surplus vector z = (4,14,24) and the corresponding excess vector e(z) = (-2,-2,-2,4,14,24).
By (2) we see that e(x) is leximin preferred to e(z). Through iterative pairwise comparisons of each leximin-ordered excess vector, it can then be shown that z is indeed the nucleolus for this particular game. Hence, the nucleolus provides an egalitarian solution in terms of the coalition-wise net benefits associated with forming the grand coalition.
The per-capita nucleolus is obtained in the same way as the nucleolus, except that
to account for the cardinality of each coalition. We present the pseudocode used to calculate the nucleolus in Section 3.2.
(The actual C++ source code is available upon request from the authors.)
The Interactive Geometry
For graphical purposes, our interactive program specializes in three-player games. The interface, depicted in Figure 1 for the SV (using the characteristic function depicted in Table 1 ), consists of a view which draws a simplex and lines representing coalition-wise values of the characteristic function. The user can set the values for the characteristic function via a dialog box that appears by clicking the "Set" button on the toolbar (discussed further in Section 3.3). The toolbar provides three additional buttons to calculate the corresponding SV, nucleolus, and per-capita nucleolus. In the process of determining these surplus-sharing values, the core is also determined by "shrinking" the simplex according to the constraints on surpluses for each proper coalition. In the case of Figure 1 , the core represents 7.4% of the total area of the simplex.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
The program is built by C++ with object-oriented capabilities for graphical user interface. Figure 2 describes the overall system relations.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]

Construction of the Simplex and Determination of the Core
To see how the simplex is constructed and the core determined in Figure 1 , consider its partial construction in Figure 3 . In this figure, the simplex is shown from its threedimensional perspective with the coordinates of each of its vertices normalized by the surplus value of the grand coalition. Recalling from Figure 1 that the allocation for the singleton coalition {1} is x 1 = 1, or one-ninth of the value of the grand coalition, the area denoted A is effectively "cut away" from the simplex. Similarly, based on the allocation for the coalition {2,3} of x 2 + x 3 = 6, or two-thirds of the value of the grand coalition, the area denoted B is also cut away from the simplex. This cutting away process is performed for each of the proper coalitions listed in Figure 1 until the simplex has shrunk to its core, depicted as the shaded area in Figure 1 .
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE]
Computation of the Surplus-Sharing Values
As discussed in Section 2, the interactive program computes and graphically depicts the SV, nucleolus, and per-capita nucleolus allocations. Computation of the SV is performed using (1). With respect to the nucleolus and per-capita nucleolus, recall that both of these surplus-sharing allocations are derived using the same algorithm, except that the latter divides the coalitional net benefits by their respective cardinalities. We therefore focus solely on the computation of the nucleolus.
Although the search for the nucleolus involves finding a maxima, gradient-based approaches (e.g., the Newton method) are not relevant since the values assigned by the leximin ordering are in general non-differentiable. We therefore use the following pseudocode to conduct a search in the two-dimensional simplex:
where the "compare" command initiates comparisons of the leximin orderings. To sort the comparisons, we then employ the following "Bubble Sort" algorithm. 3
The sorting procedure enables a straightforward comparison of the leximin ordered vectors.
Construction and Representation of Characteristic Function
Characteristic functions are represented by an n-dimensional array of size two for each dimension. This is because the power set 2 N literary contains 2 n elements. If we denote a characteristic function by v[i] [j] [k] for three-player case, the representation is given by
and so on.
Our program provides two options for specifying the characteristic function. One 
Conclusion
This paper has demonstrated an interactive program that can be used to supplement undergraduate-and graduate-level cooperative game theory courses by graphically demonstrating (i) the construction of the core and (ii) the determination and location of the common Shapley value, nucleolus, and per-capita nucleolus surplus-sharing allocations for games with three players. Because the geometry for the construction of the core is common across all cooperative games, the program can conceivably be augmented with new surplus-sharing rules as they are introduced in the literature. As a result, the program can be thought of as a "one-stop" graphical interface for surplussharing games. x 1 = 1/9
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